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Abstract—Group Testing (GT) addresses the problem of identi-
fying a small subset of defective items from a large population, by
grouping items into as few test pools as possible. In Adaptive GT
(AGT), outcomes of previous tests can influence the makeup of
future tests. This scenario has been studied from an information
theoretic point of view. Aldridge 2012 showed that in the regime
of a few defectives, adaptivity does not help much, as the number
of tests required for identification of the set of defectives is
essentially the same as for non-adaptive GT.
Secure GT considers a scenario where there is an eavesdropper
who may observe a fraction δ of the outcomes, and should not be
able to infer the status of the items. In the non-adaptive scenario,
the number of tests required is 1/(1 − δ) times the number of
tests without the secrecy constraint.
In this paper, we consider Secure Adaptive GT. Specifically,
when an adaptive algorithm has access to a private feedback
link of rate Rf , we prove that the number of tests required
for both correct reconstruction at the legitimate user, with high
probability, and negligible mutual information at the eavesdrop-
per is 1/min{1, 1− δ+Rf} times the number of tests required
with no secrecy constraint. Thus, unlike non-secure GT, where
an adaptive algorithm has only a mild impact, under a security
constraint it can significantly boost performance. A key insight
is that not only the adaptive link should disregard test results
and send keys, these keys should be enhanced through a “secret
sharing" scheme before usage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Group Testing (GT) was introduced in the seminal study by
Dorfman to identify syphilis infected draftees while dramati-
cally reducing the number of required assays [1]. Specifically,
the objective of GT is to identify a small subset of K
unknown defective items within a much larger set of N items,
conducting as few measurements T as possible.
This problem has been analyzed in various scenarios [2],
one of which, Non-Adaptive Group Testing (NGT), is when the
entire pooling strategy is decided on beforehand. This scenario
has also been formulated as a channel coding problem, e.g.,
[3]–[6], where each codeword is associated with the pool tests
its associated item participates in.
Secure GT protects the items’ privacy such that an eaves-
dropper who may observe only a fraction of the pool-tests,
will not be able to infer the status of any of the items
(negligible mutual information between the captured pool-tests
and the status of the items). [7] addressed the Secure Non-
adaptive Group Testing (SNGT) model. In order to confuse the
eavesdropper, instead of each item having a single test vector,
determining in which pool-tests it should participate, each item
has a random vector, chosen from a known set. [7] proved that
when the fraction of tests observed by the eavesdropper (Eve)
is 0 ≤ δ < 1, the number of tests required for both correct
Figure 1: Analogy between channel scheme with feedback to
Secure Adaptive Group Testing.
reconstruction at the legitimate user and negligible mutual
information at Eve’s side is 1/(1 − δ) times the number of
tests required with no secrecy constraint. Thus, the solution
in [7] relies on information theoretic security, which offers
security at the price of rate, or, in the GT case, trades security
and the number of tests.
In this paper, we consider Adaptive Group Testing (AGT),
in which the outcomes of previous tests can influence the
construction of future pools. In general, the adaptivity may
benefit from both a reduced number of tests (T ) and efficient
decoding techniques [8]. However, it has been shown that in
many interesting cases, the decrease in T is negligible. Several
studies have analyzed AGT as a channel coding problem with
feedback (e.g., [9]–[13]). Utilizing the same techniques as
Shannon’s seminal study [14] which proved that feedback
does not increase channel capacity, the authors in [9] showed
that feedback from the lab does not decrease the number
of tests required significantly. That is, if T is the minimal
number of tests required for reconstruction with negligible
error, when N →∞ the gain due to the adaptivity is marginal.
Even with zero-error, the difference in T is only between
O(K2 logN/ logK) and O(K logN) [2].
Surprisingly, we show that in secure-adaptive group testing,
the adaptive feedback link may decrease the number of tests
required significantly, which in some cases coincides with the
number of pool tests required with no secrecy constraint at all.
While from an information theoretic perspective, previous re-
sults indeed show that in communication feedback can increase
secrecy capacity [15]–[17], herein, previous techniques do not
apply directly, as the test transferred are physical entities which
cannot be, e.g., one-time-padded, and, as we explain in the
sequel, the “encoder” in this case has no knowledge on which
K of the N items it needs to protect.
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Main Contribution
We propose a new Secure Adaptive Group Testing (SAGT)
algorithm. This algorithm significantly reduces the number of
tests required, yet is sufficient for the legitimate user to identify
the defective items, and to keep an eavesdropper ignorant
regarding any of the items.
The model is depicted in Figure 1. In the suggested solution,
the set of indices describing the defective items takes the place
of a confidential message; the testing matrix represents the
design of the pools, where each row corresponds to a separate
item. Each such matrix row is associated with a codeword
where 1 denotes the pool tests that the corresponding item
participates. The decoding algorithm is analogous to a channel
decoding process, yet now the adaptive link from the lab (who
examines the pools) to the mixer (who mixes the samples and
creates the pooled tests) takes the place of a feedback link.
The eavesdropper observation is analogous to the output of
an erasure channel, such that only part of the tests sent from
the legitimate source (the mixer) to the legitimate receiver are
observed by the eavesdropper. We assume a private adaptive
link, which is not observable to the eavesdropper.
We use the feedback link from the lab to the mixer in order
to modify the testing matrix, according to the shared infor-
mation between them, in a way which can be comprehended
by both the lab and the mixer, yet confuses the eavesdropper
regarding which item participates in each pool test. However,
unlike wiretap channels with feedback, we cannot use the
data on the link directly, and must use a coding scheme, to
increase the number of keys we can generate. Although the
keys generated are dependent, any subset which Eve eventually
observes is independent and thus protected. Accordingly, this
adaptive algorithm decreases the factor 1/(1 − δ) given in
SNGT, and one may use a smaller number of tests. In the
case that the information rate on the feedback is equal to the
rate of the eavesdropper’s observation, this factor is completely
rescinded. Thus, we achieve the same sufficiency bound on T
as given for the non-secure GT.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In SAGT, a legitimate user wishes to identify a small
unknown subset K of defective items form a larger set N ,
while reducing the number of measurements ,T , as much
as possible and keeping an eavesdropper, which is able to
observe a subset of the tests results ignorant regarding the
status of the N items. The adaptive link allows the outcomes
from previous tests to influence the makeup of future tests
in order to further reduce the total number of measurements.
N = |N |, K = |K| denote the total number of items, and
the number of defective items, respectively. The status of
the items, defective or not, should be kept secure from the
eavesdropper, but detectable by the legitimate user. We assume
that in each round the number K of defective items is known
apriori. This is a common assumption in the GT literature
[18]. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the model.
Throughout the paper, we use boldface to denote matrices,
capital letters to denote random variables, lower case letters
to denote their realizations, and calligraphic letters to denote
the alphabet. Logarithms are in base 2 and hb(·) denotes the
binary entropy function.
In general, GT is defined by a testing matrix
X = {Xj(t)}1≤j≤N,1≤t≤T ∈ {0, 1}N×T ,
where each row corresponds to a separate item j ∈
{1, . . . , N}, and each column corresponds to a separate pool
test t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. For the j-th item, entry Xj(t) = 1 if
item j participates in the t-th pool test and Xj(t) = 0 if is
not. Denoting by Aj ∈ {0, 1} an indicator function indicating
whether the j-th item belongs to the defective set, the pool
test outcome Y (t) ∈ Y T is
Y (t) =
N∨
j=1
Xj(t)Aj =
∨
d∈K
Xd(t),
where
∨
is used to denote the boolean OR operation.
In AGT, we assume that the makeup of a testing pool can
depend on the outcomes of earlier tests, by adaptive feedback
link from the lab to the mixer, such that for any test t > 1
and any item j, Xj(t) = Xj(t|Y (1), . . . , Y (t − 1)). In the
secure model, we assume this link is private, and at a limited
rate Rf . That is, symbols Ft, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} are sent over an
adaptive private feedback link, secretly from the eavesdropper.
The feedback alphabets are denoted by {F1, . . . ,FT }. Their
cardinalities must satisfy
1
T
T∑
t=1
log(|Ft|) ≤ Rf .
At each time instant t, Ft−1 is computed by the lab and
revealed to the mixer. The symbol Ft at time instant t may
depend on Y t−1, the t−1 prior outcomes of the pool tests, the
previous feedback symbols, F t−1, and some randomness. That
is, we assume there exists a distribution p(Ft|Y t−1, F t−1).
Hence, in the secure AGT
Xj(t) = Xj(t|F t).
Note that in the classic adaptive case, where simply the
previous outcome is revealed to the mixer, we have Ft = Yt−1,
hence |Ft| = 2 for all t and therefor Rf = 1.
In SAGT, we assume an eavesdropper, which observes a
noisy vector ZT = {Z(1), . . . , Z(T )}, generated from the
outcome vector Y T . We concentrate on the erasure case, where
the probability of erasure is 1− δ, i.i.d. for each test. That is,
on average, Tδ outcomes are not erased and are available to
the eavesdropper via ZT .
Denote by W ∈ W , {1, . . . , (NK)} the index of the subset
of defective items. We assume W is uniformly distributed, that
is, there is no apriori bias to any specific subset. Denote by
Wˆ (Y T , FT ) the index recovered by the legitimate decoder,
after observing Y T . We refer to the adaptive procedure of
creating the testing matrix, together with the decoder as a
SAGT algorithm. We are interested in the asymptotic behavior
of a SAGT algorithm.
Figure 2: Noiseless secure adaptive group-testing setup.
Definition 1. A sequence of SAGT algorithms with param-
eters N,K,T and Rf is asymptotically reliable and weakly
secure if: (1) At the legitimate receiver, observing Y T ,
lim
T→∞
P (Wˆ (Y T , FT ) 6= W ) = 0.
(2) At the eavesdropper, observing ZT ,
lim
T→∞
1
T
I(W ;ZT ) = 0.
III. RELATED WORK
Recently works [3]–[5], [7], [9]–[13] adopted an informa-
tion theoretic perspective on GT, presenting it as a channel
coding problem. We briefly review the most relevant results.
In [3], the authors mapped the NGT model to an equivalent
channel model, where the defective set takes the place of the
message, the testing matrix rows are codewords, and the test
outcomes are the received signal. They let Sˆ(XT , Y T ) denote
the estimate of the defective subset S, which is random due
to the randomness in X and Y . Furthermore, let Pe denote
the average probability of error, averaged over all subsets
S of cardinality K, variables XT and outcomes Y T , i.e.,
Pe = Pr[Sˆ(X
T , Y T ) 6= S]. Then, where (S1,S2) denote
the partition of defective set S into disjoint sets S1 and S2
with cardinalities i, the flowing bounds on the total number
of tests required in Bernoulli NGT was given by T ≤ T ≤ T ,
where for some ε > 0 independent of N and K,
T = (1 + ε) · max
i=1,...,K
log
(
N−K
i
)
I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y )
,
T = max
i=1,...,K
log
(
N−K+i
i
)
I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y )
,
In [9], the authors considered the AGT model as channel
coding with feedback, where future inputs to the channel
can depend on past outputs. Shannon proved that feedback
does not improve the capacity of a single-user channel [14].
However, due to the non-tightness of the bounds on testing in
the non-adaptive case, the authors could not show that adaptive
GT requires the same number of tests as non-adaptive testing
exactly. Alternatively, they showed that it obeys the same lower
bound and requires no more tests than the non-adaptive case.
Moreover, in [11], using a similar analogy to channel coding
problem, the authors defined the AGT rate R as log2
(
N
K
)
/T
and introduced the capacity C, that is, if for any ε > 0, there
exists a sequence of algorithms with
lim
N→∞
log2
(
N
K
)
T a
≤ C − ε
and success probability approaching one, yet with
limN→∞ log2
(
N
K
)
/T > C it approaches zero.
In our earlier work [7], we focused on SNGT. We considered
a scenario where there is an eavesdropper which is able to
observe a subset of the outcomes. We proposed a SNGT algo-
rithm, which keeps the eavesdropper with leakage probability
δ, ignorant regarding the items’ status. Specifically, when the
fraction of tests observed by Eve is 0 ≤ δ < 1, [7] proved that
the number of tests required for both correct reconstruction at
the legitimate user and negligible mutual information at Eve’s
side is 11−δ times the number of tests required with no secrecy
constraint. Then, where I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y ) ≥ i/K, according
[7, Claim 1], the flowing bounds on the total number of tests
required in Bernoulli SNGT was given by T s ≤ Ts ≤ T s,
where for some ε > 0 independent of N and K,
T s =
1 + ε
1− δ maxi=1,...,K
K
i
log
(
N −K
i
)
,
T s =
1
1− δ log
(
N
K
)
.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Under the model definition given in Section II, our main
results are the following sufficiency (direct) and necessity
(converse) conditions, characterizing the maximal number of
tests required to guarantee both reliability and security. The
direct proof and leakage are given in Section V. The remaining
proofs are deferred to Section VI.
A. Direct (Sufficiency)
With a private rate limited feedback link, the sufficiency
part is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume a SAGT model with N items, out of which
K = O(1) are defective. For any δ < 1 and private adaptive
rate limited feedback 0 < Rf < 1, if
T as ≥
1 + ε
min{1, 1− δ +Rf} maxi=1,...,K
K
i
log
(
N −K
i
)
,
for some ε > 0 independent of N and K, then there exists a
sequence of SAGT algorithms which are reliable and weakly
secure. That is, as N →∞, both the average error probability
approaches zero and an eavesdropper with leakage probability
δ is kept ignorant.
It is important to note that if Rf ≥ δ, as the direct proof will
show, the information obtained over the adaptive link between
the lab and the mixer is powerful enough to obtain security
without increasing T . Hence, in this case, the direct bounds
of the non-secure and secure adaptive group testing are equal,
that is, T = T as . Even when Rf < δ, the information obtained
over the feedback between the lab and the mixer reduces the
upper bound on the number of the tests required in SNGT,
thus, T < T as ≤ T s.
Using an upper bound, such that, log
(
N−K
i
) ≤
i log (N−K)ei , the maximization in Theorem 1 can be solved
easily, leading to a simple bound on T .
Corollary 1. For SAGT with parameters K << N and T ,
reliability and secrecy can be maintained with
T as ≥
1 + ε
min{1, 1− δ +Rf}K log(N −K)e.
Remark 1. In this paper, we consider the asymptotic case
in T and negligible error. In this case, without a secrecy
constrain, it is well known that feedback does not help [9].
Nonetheless, with a secrecy constraint we show that the link
is used only for shared randomness. However, for finite T and
zero error [2], the mixer may use the previous outcomes to
reduce the number of tests T . Thus, for finite T , zero error
and a secrecy constraint, is not trivial what should be shared
over the link, either pure randomness in order to cope with
the secrecy constraint or single previous outcomes in order to
try adaptively reduce the number of tests.
B. Converse (Necessity)
The necessity part is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let T be the minimum number of tests necessary
to identify the defective set Sw of cardinality K among
population of size N in a SAGT model with private adaptive
rate limited feedback 0 ≤ Rf ≤ 1 while keeping eavesdropper,
with pooling outcome test leakage probability δ < 1, ignorant
regarding the status of the items. Then,
T as ≥
1
min{1, 1− δ +Rf} log
(
N
K
)
.
The proof is deferred to Section VI. Note that, compared
to the lower bound without a security constraints, there is an
increase by a multiplicative factor of 1/min{1, 1− δ +Rf}.
When Rf ≥ δ, the lower bounds of the non-secure and secure
adaptive group testing are equal, i.e., T = T as .
C. Secrecy capacity in SAGT
Returning to the analogy in [11] between channel capacity
and group testing, one might define by Cs the (asymptotic)
minimal threshold value for log
(
N
K
)
/T , above which no
reliable and secure scheme is possible. Under this definition,
where C is the capacity without the security constraint, the
result in this paper show that Cs ≥ (min{1, 1− δ +Rf})C .
Clearly, this can be written as,
Cs ≥ min{C,C − C(δ) + C(Rf )},
raising the usual interpretation as the difference between the
capacity to the legitimate decoder and that to the eavesdropper,
yet, with the capacity of the information obtained over the
feedback link between the legitimate decoder and encoder
[15]–[17]. Note that as the effective number of tests Eve sees
is Te = δT , hence her GT capacity is (δ)C.
V. CODE CONSTRUCTION WITH ADAPTIVE PRIVATE
FEEDBACK AND A PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
The goal, in general, is to design a proper testing matrix, or,
specifically, an algorithm to adaptively update it. Remember
that each row describes the tests an item participates in.
We thus construct this matrix in batches (of T tests each),
each time selecting an appropriate row for each item. In a
batch, for each item we generate a bin, containing several
sub-bins, with several rows in each sub-bin (see Figure 3).
Internal randomness in the mixer, which is not shared with
any other party, is used to select a sub-bin for each item,
while data received from the adaptive link is used to select
the right row from the sub-bin. While this solution is inspired
by codes for wiretap channels with rate limited feedback [16],
there are several key differences, which not only change the
construction, but also require non-trivial processing of the data
received from the feedback. Specifically, first, unlike a wiretap
channel, herein there are N items, only K of them, unknown
to the mixer, actually participate in the output (“transmit”).
Thus, bins and sub-bins sizes should be properly normalized.
More importantly, the mixer, which acts as an encoder, does
not know which K messages it should protect. Thus, the mixer
should artificially blow-up the data it receives from the private
feedback: from bits (used as keys) intended to protect the K
defective items, it generates a larger number of keys, sufficient
N items, satisfying the property that any K out of the N
which will eventually participate, will still be protected. In
other words, the keys received from the feedback cannot be
used as is, and an interesting secret sharing-type scheme must
be used.
Formally, a (batch-processing) SAGT code consists of an
index set W = {1, 2, . . . (NK)}, its w-th item corresponding
to the w-th subset K ⊂ {1, . . . , N}; A discrete memoryless
source of randomness at the mixer (RX , pRX ); A discrete
memoryless source of randomness at the lab (RY , pRY );
A feedback at rate Rf bits per test, resulting in an index
I ∈ {1, . . . , 2TRf } after T uses; We use a single index due
to the batch processing (Section V-A describes a test-by-test
adaptive algorithm based on the one herein); The mixer, of
course, does not know which items are defective, thus it needs
to select a row for each item. However, since only the rows
of the defective items affect the output Y T , it is beneficial to
define an “encoder"
GX :W ×RX × I → XSw ∈ {0, 1}K×T ,
Figure 3: Encoding process for a SAGT code.
that is, mapping the message, the randomness and input from
the adaptive link to the K codewords which are summed
to give the tests output Y T . Note that a stochastic encoder
and the causally known feedback message I are similar to
encoders ensuring information theoretic security, as random-
ness is required to confuse the eavesdropper about the actual
information [16], [19].
A decoder at the legitimate user is a map
Wˆ : Y T × I → W.
The probability of error is P (Wˆ 6= W ). The probability that
an outcome test leaks to the eavesdropper is δ. We assume
a memoryless model, i.e., each outcome Y (t) depends only
on the corresponding input XSw(t), and the eavesdropper
observes Z(t), generated from Y (t) according to
p(Y T , ZT |XSw) =
T∏
t=1
p(Y (t)|XSw(t))p(Z(t)|Y (t)).
Next we provide the detailed construction and analysis.
1) Codebook Generation: Choose integers F and M such
that
log2(F ) = T (Rf/K) and log2(M) = T (δ −Rf − )/K.
For each item we generate bin of M · F independent and
identically distributed codewords. Each codeword of size T is
generated randomly, where each Xj(t) is chosen according to
P (x) ∼ Bernoulli(ln(2)/K). Consequently,
P (XT ) =
T∏
i=1
P (xi).
Then we split each bin to sub-bins of codewords xT (m, f),
1 ≤ m ≤M and 1 ≤ f ≤ F (illustrated in Figure 3).
2) Key Generation: We now describe the generation of
the shared keys created from the information sent over the
adaptive link. This link is of rate Rf . We do not use it to
send information about test results, and simply send random
bits. Therefore, in a block of length T we receive S = TRf
secret bits. We divide the secret bits to K secret keys, each
constituting TRf/K = SK bits.
Our goal is to take these K keys, and use them to create N
new keys, with the property that if the original K keys had
a random uniform i.i.d. distribution, then any set of K keys
out the N new ones will have the same random uniform i.i.d.
distribution. This can be done using a generator matrix of an
[N,K] MDS code. Such a generator matrix has the property
that any K columns are linearly independent. Thus, taking the
K original keys, as an SK ×K matrix, and multiplying it by
the generator matrix GK×N creates a matrix of size SK ×N ,
where each column is used as the new key. Since any subset of
K columns of G is invertible, each set of K new keys is simply
a 1 : 1 transformation of the K original keys. The importance
of this scheme in our context is as follows: for any subset
of K new keys (out of N ), if an eavesdropper has no access
to the original K keys, he/she is ignorant regarding the new
keys. Moreover, it is important to note that unlike protection
using a one-time-pad, these keys cannot be XORed with the
rows of the testing matrix, as this operation will change the
probability of each item participating in a pool-test, deviating
from the optimal distribution of the testing matrix.
3) Testing: The mixer receives the TRf feedback secret
bits, divides them to K keys and uses the MDS code to create
N new keys. Each new key is of length TRf/K. Therefore,
at each round and for each item j, the mixer selects a sub-
bin using its internal randomness, and a message within it
using the key. The result is a codeword xT (m, f). Therefore,
the SAGT matrix contains N randomly selected codewords of
length T , one for each item (defective or not).
In the first round of tests, the mixer has no available
(feedback) key, hence it operates using a larger number of
tests for that round as given for the non-adaptive SGT in [7].
Amortized over multiple rounds, this loss is negligible.
4) Decoding at the Legitimate Receiver: The decoder looks
for a collection of K codewords XTSwˆ , one from each sub-bin,
for which Y T is most likely. Namely,
P (Y T |XTSwˆ) > P (Y T |XTSw),∀w 6= wˆ.
Then, the legitimate user declares Wˆ (Y T × F ) as the set of
bins in which the rows reside.
5) Reliability: Let I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y ) denote the mutual in-
formation between XS1 and (XS2 , Y ), under the i.i.d. distribu-
tion with which the codebook was generated and remembering
that Y is the output of a Boolean channel. The following
lemma is a key step in proving the reliability of the decoding
algorithm suggested herein. This Lemma is a direct conse-
quence of [7, Lemma 1], under the enhancement that the index
of each sub-bin is set according to the known key sheared
between the legitimate decoder and the mixer at each round
of the algorithm.
Lemma 1. If the number of tests satisfies
T ≥ (1 + ε) · max
i=1,...,K
log
((
N−K
i
)
M i
)
I(XS1 ;XS2 , Y )
,
then, under the codebook above, as N →∞ the average error
probability approaches zero.
Applying [7, Claim 1], which lower bounds the mutual in-
formation between XS1 to (XS2 , Y ) by i/K, to the expression
in Lemma 1, and substituting M = 2T
δ−Rf−
K , a sufficient
condition for reliability is
T ≥ max
1≤i≤K
1 + ε
i
K
[
log
(
N −K
i
)
+
i
K
T (δ −Rf )
]
with some small . Rearranging terms results in
T ≥ max
1≤i≤K
1 + ε
min{1, 1− (1 + ε)(δ −Rf )}i/K log
(
N −K
i
)
.
This complete the reliability part. Note that the bound holds
for large K and N , and ε independent of K and N .
6) Information Leakage at the Eavesdropper: We now
prove the security constraint is met. Hence, we wish to show
that I(W ;ZT )/T → 0, as T →∞. Denote by CT the random
codebook and by XTS the set of codewords corresponding to
the true defective items. We have,
1
T I(W ;Z
T |CT )
= 1T
(
I(W,RKR
F
K ;Z
T |CT ) + I(RKRFK ;ZT |WCT )
)
, (1)
where RK is the random variable used by the encoder to
choose the sub-bins. That is, the encoder has a random variable
for each item, RK denotes the union of K such variables, for
the K defective items. RFK is again a union, this time of K
keys. These are K “shares", out of the N shares generated
by the MDS code. Since W,RK , RFK uniquely define X
T
S ,
continuing from (1), we have:
= 1T
(
I(XTS ;Z
T |CT )− I(RKRFK ;ZT |W, CT )
)
= 1T (I(X
T
S ;Z
T |CT )−H(RKRFK |W, CT )
+H(RKR
F
K |ZT ,W, CT ))
(a)
= 1T
(
(XTS ;Z
T |CT )−H(RKRFK) +H(RKRFK |ZT ,W, CT )
)
(b)
≤δ − 1TK
(
T
δ−Rf−
K + T
Rf
K
)
+ 1TH(RK |ZT ,W, CT )
(c)
≤T ,
where T → 0 as T →∞. (a) is since both RK and RFK are
independent of W and the codebook. (b) is since both keys are
uniform, the first includes K variables of T ( δ−K − RfK ) bits
each, and the second K shares of T RfK bits each. (c) follows
from [7, Section V.B]. In short, given the true K defectives,
the codebook and her output ZT , Eve sees a simple MAC
channel, at a rate slightly below her capacity. Therefore, she
can identify which codeword was selected for each item, hence
identify both RK and RFK .
A. Test design depends on the outcome of previous pool-test
In this solution, the outcome of each separate pool-test,
according to the rate of the private adaptive link, can be
available at the mixer to influence on the next test. It is
important to note that unlike the first solution, we assume that
by the adaptive link, the lab and the mixer can agree\know
which pool-test, t ∈ T , depends on the symbols sent over
the link. This assumption is not trivial, however, in various
Figure 4: Encoding process for a SAGT code where the test
design depends on the outcome of previous pool-test.
scenarios based on GT [2] this assumption holds, e.g., in the
channel problem, when the encoder (mixer) and the decoder
(lab) schedule the transmission over the main channel and the
feedback.
In the code construction phase, we generate code as in
Section V, yet, with one codeword in each sub-bin (i.e., the
feedback will not used to select the rows in the original testing
matrix). Hence for each item we have a row-bin with M row-
codewords. Moreover, for each possible column in the original
testing matrix, we generate a column-bin with two column-
codewords. Then for each j-th item, the mixer randomly
select one row for the original testing matrix randomly as in
the first setup from the j-th row-bin, yet, per pool test, one
column-codeword is selected from his column-bin to define
which items will participate in this pool test. This column
selected according to the previous outcome feedback sent after
each separate pool-test by the legitimate user to the mixer. If
the feedback of the previous outcome is not available to the
mixer, since the rate of the feedback is limited, the mixer use
the column of the original testing matrix. Figure 4 gives a
graphical representation of the code.
Specifically, in the codebook generation phase, using a
distribution P (XT ) =
∏T
i=1 P (xi), for each item we generate
a row-bin with M independent and identically distributed
row-codewords. Then in the same way, using a distribution
P (X˜N ) =
∏N
i=1 P (x˜i), for each possible column x
N (t) we
generate a column-bin with two independent and identically
distributed column-codewords.
In the testing phase, for each item j, the mixer selects
uniformly at random one row-codeword xTj (m) from his row-
bin. The lab select randomly one index in I ∈ {1, . . . , 2TRf }
and before which pool-test t ∈ T , one bit of the index will sent
to the mixer over the feedback to influence on the next test.
Note that the lab is available to send at most TRf bits. Then, in
each pool-test t, using the previous feedback outcome Ft, the
mixer selects one column-codeword x˜Nt (Ft) from the x
N (t)
column bin. In the case that the previous feedback outcome is
not available at the mixer, the mixer use the original column.
The decoder at the legitimate user (lab) know exactly which
pool test was depended on the bits sent over the feedback and
what was the indexes of the columns selected from the column-
bins by the mixer for each pool-tests. Hence, the decoder
procedure after T pool-tests, and the analysis of the reliability
and the information leakage at the eavesdropper are almost a
direct consequence of Section V.
VI. CONVERSE (NECESSITY)
In this section, we derive the necessity bound on the re-
quired number of tests, in the setup with rate limited feedback
between the legitimate user to the lab. Similar to [16], using
Fano’s inequality, for Wˆ = wˆ(Y T , FT ),
H(W |Wˆ ) ≤ 1 + Pe log
(
N
K
)
= T ,
where T → 0 as T → ∞ if Pe → 0. Since Wˆ is a function
of Y T , FT ,
H(W |Y T , FT ) ≤ H(W |Wˆ ) ≤ TT .
Using the secrecy constraint,
I(W ;ZT ) = TγT , (2)
where γT → 0 as T →∞. Consequently,
H(W )
= H(W |ZT ) + I(W ;ZT )
(a)
= H(W |ZT ) + TγT
= I(W ;Y T , FT |ZT ) +H(W |Y T , ZT , FT ) + TγT
(b)
≤ I(W ;Y T , FT |ZT ) + TT + TγT
(c)
= I(W ;FT |ZT ) + I(W ;Y T |FT , ZT ) + TδT
(d)
≤ H(FT |ZT ) + I(W,XTSw ;Y T |FT , ZT ) + TδT
where (a) follows from (2), (b) follows from Fano’s inequality
and (c) follows by defining δT = T + γT . The following
recursive lemma is now required.
Lemma 2 ( [16]). For each t ∈ {1, . . . T},
H(F t|Zt) + I(W,XtSw ;Y t|F t, Zt)
≤ H(F t−1|Zt−1) + I(W,Xt−1Sw ;Y t−1|F t−1, Zt−1)
+H(Ft|W,Xt−1Sw , F t−1, Zt−1) + I(XSwt ;Yt|Zt).
To continue, we use Lemma 2 recursively starting from (d):
H(W )
≤ H(FT |ZT ) + I(W,XTSw ;Y T |FT , ZT ) + TδT
≤ H(FT−1|ZT−1)
+I(W,XT−1Sw ;Y
T−1|FT−1, ZT−1)
+I(XSwT ;YT |ZT ) +H(FT ) + TδT
≤ H(FT−2|ZT−2)
+I(W,XT−2Sw ;Y
T−2|FT−2, ZT−2)
+I(XSwT−1 ;YT−1|ZT−1) +H(FT−1)
+I(XSwT ;YT |ZT ) +H(FT ) + TδT
≤ . . .
≤
T∑
i=1
I(XSwi ;Yi|Zi) +
T∑
i=1
H(Fi) + δT .
Thus,
H(W ) ≤
T∑
i=1
I(XSwi ;Yi|Zi) +
T∑
i=1
H(Fi) + TδT .
We now use the constraint 1T
∑T
i=1 log(|Fi|) ≤ Rf and
normalize by T . We have,
1
T
H(W ) ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
I(XSwi ;Yi|Zi) +Rf + δT .
To conclude, the well-known technique of introducing a time
sharing random variable is used. Assume Q is independent of
XTSw , Y T , ZT and uniform on {1, . . . , T}, this results in
1
T
H(W ) ≤ Rf + 1
T
T∑
i=1
(I(XSwi ;Yi|Zi) + δT
= Rf +
1
T
T∑
i=1
(I(XSwi ;Yi|Zi, Q = i) + δT
= Rf + I(XSwQ ;YQ|ZQ, Q) + δT
= Rf + I(XSw ;Y |Z,Q) + δT
where XSw := XSwQ , Y := YQ, Z := ZQ,. Letting T → ∞,
δT → 0 and T → 0, hence
1
T
H(W ) ≤ Rf + I(XSw ;Y |Z,Q)
≤ Rf + I(XSw , Q;Y |Z)
= Rf + I(XSw ;Y |Z).
Hence,
1
T
H(W ) ≤ min{I(XSw ;Y ), I(XSw ;Y |Z) +Rf}.
From the above bound, and since the eavesdropper can obtain
information only from the outcomes of the legitimate user,
such that, p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|y),
1
T
H(W ) ≤ min{I(XSw ;Y ), I(XSw ;Y )−I(XSw ;Z)+Rf}.
Since H(W ) = log
(
N
K
)
, we have
1
T
log
(
N
K
)
≤ min{I(XSw ;Y ), I(XSw ;Y )−I(XSw ;Z)+Rf}.
Now let Z¯ denote the random variable corresponding to the
tests which are not available to the eavesdropper. Hence,
H(Z¯) = I(XSw ;Y )− I(XSw ;Z).
Denote by E¯ the set of tests which are not available to Eve
and by E¯γ the event {|E¯| ≤ T (1−δ)(1+γ)} for some γ > 0.
We have
H(Z¯) = P (E¯γ)H(Z¯|E¯γ) + P (E¯cγ)H(Z¯|E¯cγ)
≤ T (1− δ)(1 + γ) + TP (E¯cγ)
≤ T (1− δ)(1 + γ) + T2−T (1−δ)f(γ),
where the last inequality follows from the Chernoff bound for
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter (1 − δ) and
is true for some f(γ) such that f(γ) > 0 for any γ > 0.
Thus, we have
log
(
N
K
)
≤ T (1− δ)(1 + γ) + T2−T (1−δ)f(γ) +Rf .
That is,
T as ≥
1
min{1, 1− δ +Rf} log
(
N
K
)
.
This completes the converse proof.
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